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SYMPOSIUM: CHALLENGING
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Auer Evasions
JONATHAN H. ADLER*
ABSTRACT
Auer v. Robbins requires federal courts to defer to federal agency interpre-
tations of ambiguous regulations. Auer built upon, and arguably expanded,
the Court’s long-standing practice of deferring to agency interpretations of
their own regulations born in Bowles v. Seminole Rock. Although initially
uncontroversial, the doctrine has come under fire from legal commentators and
prominent jurists, including Auer’s author, the late Justice Antonin Scalia. As
Justice Scalia came to recognize, Auer deference enables agencies to evade a
wide range of legal constraints that are otherwise imposed upon agency behav-
ior, the ability of agencies to take action with the force of law in particular. This
brief Article seeks to explain how the practice of Auer deference undermines—
and facilitates the evasion of—basic administrative law principles of accountabil-
ity, notice, responsibility, and finality. After reviewing Auer history and
considering these evasions, the Article, ponders whether we are approaching
Auer’s end.
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INTRODUCTION
Auer v. Robbins requires that federal courts defer to federal agency interpreta-
tions of ambiguous regulations.1 Writing for a unanimous Court, the late Justice
Antonin Scalia explained that a federal agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation is “controlling” unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.”2 What matters is that the agency has put forward an official
interpretation, not that the agency has made the best sense of the relevant text.3
This is true whatever form in which the interpretation arrives, provided the
reviewing court has no reason to suspect “the interpretation does not reflect the
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.”4 Even an
interpretation first articulated in an amicus brief submitted upon court request
may suffice if necessary to elucidate the meaning of ambiguous regulatory text.5
Auer built upon, and arguably expanded, the Court’s long-standing practice
of deferring to agency interpretations of their own regulations.6 As Justice
Scalia noted, the principle that a reviewing court must accept a permissible
agency interpretation of its own regulation was fairly well-established in the
Court’s jurisprudence.7 So grounded, Auer is best broadly understood as a
cousin of other administrative law deference doctrines that likewise developed
1. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
2. Id. at 461 (cleaned up).
3. As applied in Auer, the question was whether the relevant regulatory text could “comfortably bear
the meaning the Secretary assign[ed],” not whether the Secretary had articulated the best or most
plausible interpretation. 519 U.S. at 461; see also Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702
(1991) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the Secretary’s interpretation need not be the best or most natural one by
grammatical or other standards. Rather, the Secretary’s view need be only reasonable to warrant
deference.” (citations omitted)); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) (noting that the
agency’s interpretation need only be a “plausible construction of the language of the actual regulation”).
4. 519 U.S. at 462 (“[T]hat the Secretary’s interpretation comes to us in the form of a legal
brief . . . does not, in the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of deference . . . . There is simply
no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment
on the matter in question.”). The interpretation at issue in Auer was articulated in an amicus brief
submitted at the request of the Court. Id. at 461.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989); Ford Motor
Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565–67 (1980); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872–73
(1977); INS v. Stansic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969); Thorpe v. Housing Auth. Of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276
(1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,
414 (1945). Because a variant of this doctrine was first articulated in Bowles v. Seminole Rock, it is
often referred to as Seminole Rock deference as well. See infra Part I.
7. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
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during the post-War period.8 “In practice,” Justice Scalia would note in a later
case, “Auer deference is Chevron deference applied to regulations rather than
statutes.”9 And, like Chevron, it has been a doctrine with the potential to
provide a bright-line rule for lower courts to administer.10
Although Justice Scalia authored Auer, he did not remain a fan of it for long.
Within fifteen years of Auer, he began to critique the doctrine and its implica-
tions.11 Before he would leave the Court, Justice Scalia would characterize Auer
as one of the Court’s “worst decisions ever.”12 Among other things, Justice
Scalia became concerned that the practice of deferring to an agency’s own
interpretation of its own ambiguously drafted regulation created undue incen-
tives for administrative mischief and undermined “fundamental principles of
separation of powers.”13
Were Justice Scalia’s second thoughts about Auer justified? Auer deference
has become quite controversial in the legal academy,14 as well as on the
8. See, e.g., Talk Am. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“On the
surface, it seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an a fortiori application—of the rule that we will
defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute it is charged with implementing . . . .” (citing Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); see also Matthew C.
Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. W. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (2011)
(“Chevron deference and Seminole Rock deference are closely related . . . .”). For a discussion of the
doctrines parallel development, see Michael P. Healy, The Past Present and Future of Auer Deference:
Mead, Form and Function in Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L.
REV. 633 (2014).
9. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 86 (2016) (suggesting Auer accords with “the logic underlying Chevron”).
10. Some have suggested that Justice Scalia’s desire for a bright-line rule motivated his approach in
Auer. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Cf. Auer v. Robbins, 21 TX. REV. L. & POL. 303, 304 (2017).
11. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211–12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (calling for “abandoning Auer”); Decker, 568 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“For decades, and for no good reason, we have been giving agencies the authority to
say what their rules mean, under the harmless-sounding banner of ‘defer[ring] to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of its own regulations.’”); Talk Am. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“[W]hile I have in the past uncritically accepted that rule, I have become increasingly
doubtful of its validity.”).
12. See Clarence Thomas, A Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia, 126 YALE. L.J. 1600, 1603 (2017)
(“[A] few Terms ago, as we came off the bench after hearing arguments in a case involving judicial
deference to agencies, Nino announced that Auer v. Robbins was one of the Court’s ‘worst decisions
ever.’ Although I gently reminded him that he had written Auer, that fact hardly lessened his criticism
of the decision or diluted his resolve to see it overruled.”); see also Adam Liptak, At Memorial, Scalia
Remembered as Happy Combatant, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/us/
politics/at-memorial-scalia-remembered-as-happy-combatant.html.
13. See Talk America, 564 U.S. at 68. This separation of powers critique of Auer and Seminole Rock
is developed most fully in John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996).
14. For a sampling of contemporary academic views of Auer and Seminole Rock deference, see
Symposium, Reflections on Seminole Rock: The Past, Present and Future of Deference to Agency
Regulatory Interpretations, NOTICE & COMMENT (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id2847668.
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bench.15 In Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, Professor Philip Hamburger
critiques administrative law for, among other things, its “evasion” of constitu-
tional rights, institutions and processes.16 This evasion renders administrative
law “unlawful” and “extralegal” as it enables administrative agencies to enforce
legal constraints on the public without proper authorization in law.
As Justice Scalia came to recognize, the practice of Auer deference is among
the most egregious examples of the sort of evasion that Professor Hamburger
fears. Insofar as this doctrine requires courts to defer to agencies’ interpretations
of their own ambiguous regulations, it enables agencies to evade a wide range
of legal constraints that are otherwise imposed upon agency behavior, particu-
larly the ability of agencies to take action with the force of law. Even if one
rejects Professor Hamburger’s critique of administrative law and agency eva-
sion generally, the evasions of Auer deference are still of concern.17
This brief Article seeks to explain how the practice of Auer deference
undermines—and facilitates the evasion of—basic administrative law prin-
ciples. Part I provides an abbreviated history of the doctrine, and explains how
Auer deference, as it is practiced today, is more expansive and permissive than
the foundation provided by Bowles v. Seminole Rock requires. Part II explains
how, despite their operational similarity, the Chevron and Auer doctrines are
actually quite distinct: Chevron and Auer rest on separate foundations and thus
have separate domains. Building on this analysis, Part III identifies multiple
ways in which Auer facilitates the potential evasion of traditional administrative
law principles. Part IV identifies the practice of evasion in the context of a
recent controversy, and Part V ponders whether we are approaching Auer’s end.
15. In addition to the late Justice Scalia, three members of the current Court have raised questions
about Auer and expressed a willingness to reconsider the doctrine. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds,
Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Perez v.
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring); id., at 1213–25 (Thomas,
J., concurring in judgment); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615–16 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring). See also Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1208 n.4 (noting Auer deference is “not an inexorable
command in all cases”).
16. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 29 (2014) (“Administrative law
evades not only the law but also its institutions, processes and rights.”).
17. Professor Hamburger’s work has garnered substantial attention and favorable notice in court
opinions. See e.g. Dept. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Amer. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1243 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring); Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting);
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Esquivel-
Quintana v. Lynch, 801 F.3d. 1019, 1027 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-
part). At the same time, it has prompted strong reactions, for and against, within the academy. See, e.g.,
Gary Lawson, The Return of the King: The Unsavory Origins of Administrative Law, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1521 (2015) (supportive of Hamburger thesis); Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547 (2015)
(critical of Hamburger thesis); Paul Craig, The Legitimacy of US Administrative Law and the Founda-
tions of English Administrative Law: Setting the Historical Record Straight (Univ. of Oxford Legal
Research Series, Paper No. 44, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2802784.
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I. AUER HISTORY
The doctrine of deferring to agency interpretations has its roots in the price
controls of the 1940s.18 In 1942, Congress enacted the Emergency Price Control
Act (EPCA)19 in an effort to curb wartime inflation.20 The EPCA delegated
power to the Office of Price Administration (OPA) to impose price ceilings and
other price stabilization measures. Among the measures OPA adopted was
Maximum Price Regulation No. 188, which barred sellers from charging prices
higher than those charged during March of 1942.21 Although this may have
seemed like a straightforward rule, disputes would arise over how to apply the
relevant price ceilings in particular contexts.
One such dispute involved the Seminole Rock & Sand Company, which had
contracted to sell crushed rock in March 1942 for $1.50 per ton, but never made
delivery.22 According to the company, it was entitled to continue selling crushed
rock at this price. The OPA, on the other hand, did not believe the unfulfilled
contract set the ceiling price under the Maximum Price Regulation, as it was not
the “highest price charged during March 1942” for materials that were actually
delivered.23 Rather, according to the OPA, the ceiling price was only $0.60 per
ton, as that was the most the Seminole Rock & Sand Company had received for
crushed rock that was actually delivered during the relevant time period.24
In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., the Supreme Court sided with the
OPA. Focusing on the text, a unanimous Court concurred with the OPA’s
reading of its Maximum Price Regulation. Recognizing the complexity of the
question, however, the Court went on to note that, insofar as the text was
unclear, the OPA’s interpretation mattered:
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court
must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if
the meaning of the words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the
principles of the Constitution in some situations may be relevant in the first
instance in choosing between various constructions. But the ultimate criterion
is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation . . . . In this
case the only problem is to discover the meaning of certain portions of
18. For a thorough discussion of this history, see Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth,
Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65 EMORY L.J. 47 (2015); see also Sanne H. Knudsen &
Amy J. Wildermuth, Lessons from the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 647
(2015); Jeffrey A Pojanowski, Revisiting Seminole Rock, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87 (2018).
19. Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23.
20. See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 18 at 56–57.
21. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413 (1945); see also 7 Fed. Reg. 5872
(July 30, 1942).
22. See Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 412.
23. See id. at 414.
24. See id. at 415.
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Maximum Price Regulation No. 188. Our only tools, therefore, are the plain
words of the regulation and any relevant interpretations of the Administrator.25
While the Court offered that the agency’s interpretation could be of “control-
ling weight,” its reasoning “placed greater weight” on the actual text of the
regulation at issue.26 In considering whether Seminole Rock had violated the
federal price controls, the Court engaged in its own assessment of the relevant
text, independently reaching the same conclusion as the OPA as to the meaning
of the relevant rules.27 The “plain words” here were enough to decide the case.
Only after concluding that the price ceiling was to be based on “what actually
was delivered, not with what might have been delivered,” did the Court turn to
the OPA’s administrative interpretation.28 The Court here noted that “any doubts”
as to its conclusion were “removed” by the OPA’s contemporaneous interpreta-
tion of the Maximum Price Regulation offered in a guidance document issued
and distributed to manufacturers when the rule was first promulgated.29 This
“consistent” interpretation, offered “concurrently” with the issuance of the rule,
confirmed that the Court’s interpretation aligned with the OPA’s intent in
promulgating the rule.30 The contemporaneously published guidance materials
were “relevant interpretations” and were probative of the agency’s intent in
drafting the regulatory text.31 Nonetheless, the OPA’s interpretation merely
confirmed what the Court had concluded on its own. It did not control—and
may not even have influenced—the outcome of the case.
The Court’s cursory Seminole Rock opinion did not offer much explanation
for the principle of deference it appeared to announce.32 As Justice Scalia would
later note, Seminole Rock “offered no justification whatever—just the ipse dixit
that ‘the administrative interpretation . . . becomes of controlling weight unless
it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”33 Perhaps due to
this lack of explication—or perhaps due to the narrow context in which the
25. See id. at 413–14.
26. Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 18 at 60.
27. For a brief discussion of the drafting of the Seminole Rock opinion, see Aditya Bamzai, Henry
Hart’s Brief, Frank Murphy’s Draft, and the Seminole Rock Opinion, in Symposium, supra note 14, at
5–6.
28. See 325 U.S. at 417.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. As Aditya Bamzai notes, the draft opinion circulated by Justice Murphy included language
indicating that the task for the Court was to determine what the agency had intended when it issued the
regulation at issue. As Justice Murphy wrote, “the sole issue is to resolve a dispute as to the meaning
that an administrative agency intended to attach to one of its regulations.” See Bamzai, supra note 27,
at 5.
33. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 617–18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Manning, supra note 13, at 619 (“the Court in Seminole Rock did not offer any
detailed rationale for binding deference.”).
6 [Vol. 16:1THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
Seminole Rock case arose—commentators largely ignored the decision.34 The
Court itself would not rely upon Seminole Rock to justify deferring to an
agency’s regulatory interpretation for another two decades.35
In the years immediately following, Seminole Rock was rarely cited outside
the price control context, and even then, courts tended to apply it in a limited
fashion, only giving meaningful consideration to public, contemporaneous inter-
pretations.36 In this regard, courts seemed to take their cues from the Court’s
narrow method in Seminole Rock—and the fact that the Court’s decision was in
line with other decisions reviewing agency interpretations37—rather than from
its potentially expansive language.
It is also possible that Seminole Rock was applied in so limited a fashion due
to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA, after all, was enacted in
1946, one year after Seminole Rock was decided.38 Among other things, it
provides that reviewing courts are to determine the “meaning . . . of an agency
action,”39 which would seem to suggest that abject deference to agency interpre-
tations is inappropriate.
Seminole Rock’s relative obscurity would not last. In the 1960s, lower courts
began to adopt a more robust reading of the decision and its implications for
judicial review of agency actions.40 Across the circuits, courts increasingly
applied Seminole Rock as a limit on courts’ ability to resolve regulatory
ambiguity, rather than as a guide for how to discern the regulatory meaning.41
Although the Supreme Court had not previously indicated that Seminole Rock
should be read as a limitation on court’s interpretive power, the Court embraced
this understanding in 1965 in Udall v. Tallman.42 As in Seminole Rock, the
Court articulated a broader rule than it seemed to apply, and did so without
34. In a 1950 article, Kenneth Culp Davis characterized the Court’s discussion of deference to
regulatory interpretations as “hardly more than dictum.” See Kenneth Culp Davis, Scope of Review of
Federal Administrative Action, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 596 n.179 (1950). As Knudsen and Wildermuth
note, academics and commentators “had little to say” about the decision. Knudsen & Wildermuth,
supra note 18, at 63.
35. Prior to 1965, the only case in which the Supreme Court cited Seminole Rock was M. Kraus &
Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614 (1946). See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 18, at 63.
36. See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 18, at 65–66.
37. See Pojanowski, supra note 18 (noting the Court’s method in Seminole Rock was in line with a
traditional application of Skidmore deference).
38. See Bamzai, supra note 27, at 7 (“An important question is whether the APA’s scope-of-review
provision leaves in place, or rejects, Justice Murphy’s approach in Seminole Rock.”).
39. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” (emphasis
added)).
40. See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 18, at 69–77 (discussing the evolution of Seminole
Rock’s application in the lower courts).
41. Id. at 75.
42. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
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much explication.43 As in Seminole Rock, the interpretation at issue had been
public record and consistent over time. Also as in Seminole Rock, the Court did
not articulate a limiting rationale. To the contrary, in Udall the Court pro-
nounced a broad rule of deference to agency interpretations of their own
regulations: “When the construction of an administrative regulation rather than
a statute is in issue, deference is even more clearly in order.”44 Lower courts
took this cue, and a more robust and formidable deference doctrine emerged.
By the time Auer v. Robbins reached the Court, Seminole Rock had “metasta-
sized” well beyond its origins.45 Auer completed the transformation. Contrary to
Seminole Rock’s tacit suggestion, the task for reviewing courts was not to make
sense of potentially ambiguous or insufficiently precise regulatory texts. In-
stead, insofar as a regulation is ambiguous, the agency’s interpretation would be
“controlling” unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent” with the relevant text.46
As the Court had concluded a few years earlier, courts should accept proffered
agency interpretations, even if not offered contemporaneously with promulga-
tion of the rule at issue, and even if the interpretation offered was not “the best
or most natural one by grammatical or other standards.”47 Determining the
precise meaning of agency regulations was a task for the agencies themselves,
and not for the courts.
In a few paragraphs, Justice Scalia’s Auer opinion dispatched with nearly all
of Seminole Rock’s contextual limits.48 Whereas Seminole Rock deferred to a
contemporaneous interpretation, the interpretation in Auer was offered decades
after the rule at issue had been promulgated.49 Whereas the interpretation in
Seminole Rock had been issued in a public document signed by the OPA
Administrator and distributed to the regulated community, thereby providing
notice of how the rule would be applied, the interpretation in Auer came in an
amicus brief drafted in response to the Court’s invitation, years after the
litigation had begun.50 Whereas the Seminole Rock Court seemed to be con-
cerned with discerning the intended meaning of a potentially ambiguous regula-
tion, the Auer Court was ready to defer to the agency’s interpretation of its own
“creature,” so long as the interpretation was permissible and there was “no
reason to suspect” that it did “not reflect the agency’s fair and considered
43. See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 18, at 80 (noting Tallman Court “did not set out any
particular rationale as to why deferring to agency interpretations of their own regulations would be
appropriate as a general matter”).
44. 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
45. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The doctrine has metastasized.”).
46. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
47. Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991).
48. See Nielson, supra note 10 at 304 (“Under Auer, many of the limits on Seminole Rock deference
are gone.”).
49. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 457 (“The salary-basis test has existed largely in its present form since
1954.”).
50. Id. at 461.
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judgment.”51 In this regard, Auer could be seen as a decision as much about
constraining judges (and empowering executive agencies) as about anything
else.52
Whatever the Court had intended in 1945, by 1997 a full-fledged deference
doctrine had emerged—and one as potentially powerful as its more famous
cousin, Chevron.53 The problem, as discussed below, is that a more robust
doctrine of deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations facili-
tates agency evasion of important administrative law norms. Thus, it should be
no surprise that jurists, commentators, and even Auer’s author, have raised
second thoughts about this approach.54
II. AUER FOUNDATION
Auer deference is often seen as a variant or extension of Chevron deference.55
If courts are to defer to a federal administrative agency’s interpretation of an
ambiguous statute that the agency has been entrusted to administer, might it
follow that the agency should receive deference in interpreting the regulations
implementing that statute as well? It is a reasonable question to pose.
In form, the two doctrines are quite similar. Under Chevron, the reviewing
court first considers “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue” in the relevant statutory text.56 If so, the statute controls. If
the statute is “silent or ambiguous,” however, the reviewing court must defer to
the agency’s statutory interpretation, so long as it “is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”57 Similarly under Auer deference, the reviewing
court must defer to the agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation,
51. Id. at 461–62.
52. In this regard, Auer would fit comfortably with some rationales offered for other deference
doctrines, such as the comparative institutional competence and relative political accountability of
agencies. It is also in line with Justice Scalia’s oft-stated concern for clear legal rules that constrain
judicial discretion. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989).
53. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 392 (4th ed. 2010) (“[A]n agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations may receive stronger deference than its interpretation of a statutory provision.”); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr. What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Action Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85
(2011) (noting “the Supreme Court seems to be sending the lower courts an unmistakable, if implicit,
message that they should confer extraordinary deference on agency interpretations of agency rules”).
According to one treatise, deference to an agency’s interpretations of its own regulations is “[o]ne of
the most venerable doctrines in administrative law.” CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, 3
ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 10:26 (3d ed., 2010).
54. Likely the most thorough, and influential, critique of deference to agency interpretations of their
own regulations is John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996).
55. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (“Auer deference is Chevron deference applied to regulations rather than statutes.”);
see also VERMEULE, supra note 9, at 75 (noting arguments for Auer track those for Chevron).
56. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984).
57. Id. at 843.
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provided that the interpretation is reasonable and not at odds with the regulatory
text. The same policy justifications for deferring in one case—agency exper-
tise,58 agency accountability,59 and a desire for uniformity in federal law60—
would seem to apply equally in the other.61 Yet the underlying doctrinal
foundation for Chevron deference, as articulated by the Supreme Court, does
not fit Auer.
Expertise, accountability, and uniformity provide policy rationales for the
adoption of a deference regime. They do not, however, provide a legal rationale
for a binding deference requirement, particularly when Congress has appeared
to assign primary interpretive responsibility to the courts in the text of the APA
by declaring that courts are to “decide all relevant questions of law, inter-
pret . . . statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the
terms of an agency action.”62 Congress has the option of adopting laws that take
advantage of agency expertise, encourage greater political accountability, and
provide uniformity in application, but it is not constitutionally required to do so.
While Chevron itself may have been less than clear about its foundations,63
subsequent decisions have made clear that a theory of delegation provides the
58. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
549, 589–90 (1985); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“Judges are not experts in the field . . . .”); see also
Manning, supra note 13, at 629–30 (noting the “relative expertise of agencies and courts” as a reason
for a deference regime).
59. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“Judges are not . . . part of either political branch of
Government.”); Yehonatan Givati & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Deference to Inconsistent
Agency Statutory Interpretations, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 91 (2011) (“A powerful additional argument for
[deference] invokes the importance of political accountability: changes in an agency’s interpretive
position may reflect changes in the agency’s political priorities—often triggered by a change in the
presidential administration . . . .”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 515 (1989) (explaining that policy determinations are “not for the courts
but for the political branches”); see also Manning, supra note 13, at 629 (noting political accountability
as a reason for a deference regime).
60. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 861
(2001) (“Other than the Supreme Court, the only entities with the power to adopt nationally uniform
interpretations are the federal administrative agencies. Consequently, if uniformity cannot be achieved
by pushing interpretational conflicts up to the Supreme Court, it may be necessary to resolve these
conflicts by pushing them down to the agency level.”).
61. An additional justification for deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations is the
‘“common sense’ idea that an agency ‘is in a superior position to determine what it intended when it
issued a rule.’” See Manning, supra note 13, at 614 (quoting 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.10, at 282 (3d. ed. 1994)); see also Richard Pierce & Joshua
Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 515, 516–17 (2011). This justification does not, as a general matter apply to agency interpretations
of statutes. See Manning supra note 13, at 630. But see Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory
Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1037 (2015) (noting many agencies report playing a role in the
process of drafting statutory provisions that they administer).
62. See 5. U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
63. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 195 (2006) (“[T]he [Chevron]
Court announced its two-step approach without giving a clear sense of the theory that justified it.”).
Indeed, it’s not clear that the Supreme Court in Chevron understood that it was announcing a new
approach at all, let alone providing the basis for a canonical doctrine in administrative law. See Thomas
W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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underpinning for Chevron deference.64 Chevron, the Court has repeatedly ex-
plained, is “rooted in a background presumption of congressional intent.”65 This
presumption is that where Congress has delegated authority to an agency to
administer a statute, Congress understands and assumes “that the ambiguity
would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency
(rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.”66 As Chief Justice Roberts explained in King v. Burwell, Chevron “is
premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delega-
tion from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”67
Grounding Chevron in a theory of congressional intent to delegate interpre-
tive authority provides a constitutional basis for giving agencies the authority to
adopt legally binding interpretations of federal statutes.68 After all, agencies do
not have any inherent power to impose binding constraints on private actors.69
They only have that power which has been delegated to them by Congress, the
power to offer authoritative interpretations of statutory provisions included.70
Delegation also provides a basis for reconciling Chevron deference with the
text of the APA.71 So long as courts first determine that a delegation has
occurred—thereby fulfilling their obligation to decide the relevant question of
law as to whether interpretive authority has been delegated—there is no conflict
STORIES (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006). Nonetheless, “compared to Seminole Rock, Chevron is a model of
thorough and transparent legal reasoning.” Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 8, at 1454.
64. See Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron Deference,
Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1525–27 (2009) (discussing
delegation basis for Chevron).
65. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 60,
at 836 (“Chevron rests on implied congressional intent.”); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpreta-
tions Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 (1990) (“The threshold issue for the
court is always one of congressional intent: did Congress intend the agency’s interpretation to bind the
courts?”).
66. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–741 (1996); see also Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“A premise of Chevron is that when
Congress grants an agency the authority to administer a statute by issuing regulations with the force of
law, it presumes the agency will use that authority to resolve ambiguities in the statutory scheme.”).
67. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)); see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649
(1990) (“A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative
authority.”).
68. See Jonathan H. Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. REV. 983, 990–91 (2016).
69. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that an
administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated
by Congress.”).
70. As readers are likely aware, some scholars argue that the pervasive practice of delegation is itself
constitutionally problematic. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 16; DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993). The implications of
such arguments for review of agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes are beyond the scope of this
paper.
71. See Sales & Adler, supra note 64, at 1538.
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created by letting the agency’s statutory interpretation control.72 The deference
that agencies receive is a product of the legislature’s choice to delegate that
power to them.73
The delegation theory of Chevron has also caused the Court to constrain
Chevron deference, most significantly by articulating a “step zero” analysis that
must precede the granting of deference.74 As articulated in Mead and related
cases, ambiguity alone is not enough to trigger Chevron deference.75 More is
required. Specifically, courts must be able to conclude that Congress delegated
to the agency the power to act with the force of law, such as through notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.76 In addition, the agency’s interpre-
tation must have come from the exercise of such delegated authority, and the
agency must have fulfilled all the relevant procedural requirements.77
In practice, “step zero” means that if an agency wishes to obtain the benefits
of Chevron deference, it must invest agency time and resources in developing
and promulgating its interpretation. It must “pay now,” in the form of investing
agency resources to exercise delegated power to act with the force of law, or it
will “pay later” when faced with more demanding judicial review.78 Insofar as
“step zero” requires going through the rulemaking process or other procedural
steps, this can be a significant burden. Should an agency choose to forego such
efforts, however, the agency cannot claim Chevron’s protection if its interpreta-
tion is subsequently challenged in court. As the Court has made clear, interpreta-
tions offered in opinion letters, guidance manuals, and amicus briefs are
insufficient, as Congress has not delegated agencies to bind the public in such
instances.79
Neither Auer nor Seminole Rock provides an equivalent foundation for a
doctrine of deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations.80 Nor is
there any statutory provision, in the APA or anywhere else, suggesting Congress
72. See Sunstein, supra note 63, at 208 (“If the underlying theory involves implicit (and fictional)
delegation, the real question is when Congress should be understood to have delegated law-interpreting
power to an agency.”).
73. See Manning, supra note 13, at 623 (“[B]inding deference is the product of Congress’s right to
delegate legislative authority to administrative agencies.”).
74. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 60, at 836 (defining the “step zero” inquiry as “the inquiry
that must be made in deciding whether courts should turn to the Chevron framework at all”); see also
id. at 912–13 (outlining “step zero” inquiry); Sunstein, supra note 63.
75. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
76. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (“We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting
Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or
adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”).
77. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“Chevron deference is not
warranted where the regulation is ‘procedurally defective’—that is, where the agency errs by failing to
follow the correct procedures in issuing the regulation.”).
78. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 8 at 1464 (discussing how agencies have the choice to
“pay me now or pay me later”).
79. See Christensen v. Harris County, 539 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
80. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“On
the surface, it seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an a fortiori application—of the rule that we
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intended to give agencies the power to bind courts to agency interpretations of
their own regulations. Congress may well have the power to delegate such
power to federal agencies,81 but it has not done so. Neither the APA, nor any
other cross-cutting statute, indicates that Congress intended to give agencies the
power to bind courts to the agency’s views about how the agency’s rules should
be interpreted. To the contrary, the text of the APA would suggest the oppo-
site.82 If anything, Congress’s expectation that agencies would go through
various administrative processes, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking or
formal adjudication, before setting down legislative rules or imposing binding
orders suggests Congress did not intend to give agencies power to bind courts
merely by offering a regulatory interpretation.
As Justice Scalia noted in his Talk America concurrence, courts presume that
a gap or ambiguity in a statute is an implicit delegation of authority to the
implementing agency to resolve the ambiguity.83 In such cases, Congress has
given up control over how the ambiguities will be resolved. In the case of
regulations, however, an ambiguity cannot be understood in terms of delegation.
An agency that leaves an ambiguity in a promulgated regulation does not cede
control to another branch. Rather it cedes control to itself.
Even if courts conclude that agencies have a comparative institutional advan-
tage over courts in determining how ambiguous regulatory provisions should be
interpreted, either due to agency expertise or greater political accountability, it
is not clear why this should translate into a rule of deference.84 After all, under
existing precedent, deference to agency interpretations of statutes is based upon
a theory of delegated power, not prudential limits on judicial discretion or a
recognition of comparative institutional competence. It is even less clear why
such concerns should give agencies the ability to impose binding interpretations
of regulatory text when those interpretations do not purport to represent the best
interpretation of a given regulation’s meaning and intent.
If an agency interpretation is based upon the agency’s intention at the time
the regulation was promulgated or the agency’s understanding of how a given
regulation will operate in practice, nothing prevents the agency from making
this case to a reviewing court. The effect of Auer is to relieve the agency of
making any such argument—of being able to point to any plausible interpreta-
tion, adopted at any time, and for any reason. Such broad deference can neither
be justified under the umbrella of Chevron’s domain, nor by appeal to the
agency’s superior knowledge. Yet, in practice, the deference agencies receive
under Auer is as great—if not greater—than the deference they receive under
will defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute it is charged with implementing. But it is not.”
(citation omitted)).
81. See VERMEULE, supra note 9, at 75 (“Congress may allocate between courts and agencies the
power to interpret ambiguous regulations.”)
82. See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
83. Id.
84. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 8, at 1458.
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Chevron—in terms of the contexts in which such deference may be obtained,
the interpretations to which courts will defer, and (at least according to one
study) the rate at which agencies prevail.85
III. AUER EVASIONS
Whatever their superficial similarities, Auer deference lacks the sort of legal
foundation that provides for Chevron’s domain. More troubling, the doctrine of
granting controlling deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations
contradicts some of the core premises underlying the Constitution’s separation
of powers. As a consequence, Auer facilitates the evasion of multiple administra-
tive law norms.86
Even before Auer was decided, John Manning warned that deferring to
agency interpretations of their own regulations “contradicts a major premise of
our constitutional scheme and of contemporary separation of powers case
law—that a fusion of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially dangerous to
our liberties.”87 At the founding, “a core objective of the constitutional structure
was to ensure meaningful separation of lawmaking from the exposition of a
law’s meaning in particular fact situations.”88 Yet Auer enables agencies to act
as both the maker and interpreter of the laws. As Manning explained in his
highly influential article, “given the reality that agencies engage in ‘lawmaking’
when they exercise rulemaking authority,” deference to agency interpretations
of their own regulations “contradicts the constitutional premise that lawmaking
and law-exposition must be distinct.”89
The combination of the law-making and law-interpreting functions was
viewed with suspicion at the time of the nation’s founding because it was feared
that such concentration of power facilitated the abuse of government power. As
Montesquieu warned, “When legislative power is united with executive power
in a single person or in a single person of the magistracy, there is no liberty,
because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical
laws will execute them tyrannically.”90
In more concrete terms, by enabling agencies to provide legally binding
interpretations of their own regulations and allowing agencies to do so in letters,
guidance documents, and even legal briefs, Auer facilitates the evasion of
85. See William Yeatman, An Empirical Defense of Auer Step Zero, 106 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2831651.
86. See HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 114 (“[G]uidance and other such modes of ‘interpretation’ are
a mode of evasion.”). Hamburger would go even farther, calling deference to agency interpretations “an
abandonment of judicial office.” Id. at 316.
87. Manning, supra note 13, at 617.
88. Id. at 644.
89. Id. at 654.
90. Id. at 645. See also MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6, at 157 (Anne Cohler et
al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1768)
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multiple administrative law norms: accountability, responsibility, notice, and
finality. It is to these evasions this Article now turns.
A. Evasion of Accountability
Under Mead, for an agency’s statutory interpretation to be eligible for
Chevron deference, there must be an indication that Congress has delegated to
an agency the authority to act with the force of law, such as through notice-and-
comment rulemaking.91 In addition, the agency must have exercised such power
when putting forth its interpretation.92 These limits on Chevron’s domain help
ensure greater accountability within the regulatory process.93
The rule development process provides an opportunity for potentially af-
fected groups to mobilize support or opposition to a given rule. Adopting a
controversial position may trigger critical media coverage or prompt legislative
oversight of the rulemaking at issue. If an agency may avoid going through a
rulemaking and may instead offer an authoritative interpretation in a guidance
letter or other informal document, it can avoid having to justify its decision on
the record. At the same time, it may reduce the likelihood that its action prompts
critical attention from regulated entities, interest groups, Congress, and the
press. Failure to respond to the objections made on the record during the rulemaking
process is an easy basis for a reviewing court to reject a rule. This is no less true
when the question at issue is one of statutory interpretation.
As the Court recently reiterated in Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, an agency
must explain why it adopted one statutory interpretation as opposed to an-
other.94 As the Court explained, agencies are required to “give adequate rea-
sons” for their decisions, including the reasons they adopt one potential statutory
interpretation over another.95 In practice this means that an agency interpreta-
tion developed through notice-and-comment rulemaking must take account of
objections and counter-interpretations offered by commenters. This process
helps ensure that agencies are accountable for their choices, both in the context
of judicial review and in the political process.
Insofar as agencies may offer regulatory interpretations without going through
any formalized process, agencies are freed from having to take account of the
concerns of the regulated community and are held less accountable for their
interpretive choices. To the extent Auer deference enables agencies to adopt
interpretations and policies without going through the rulemaking process, it
short-circuits the ability of these administrative processes to provide for account-
91. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
92. Id.
93. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979) (“[N]otions of fairness and informed
administrative decisionmaking require that agency decisions be made only after affording interested
persons notice and an opportunity to comment.”).
94. 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016).
95. Id.
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ability within regulatory policy.96 In this way, agencies may “insulate” them-
selves from “broader political accountability.”97
B. Evasion of Notice
“Fair notice” of what the law requires is a “fundamental principle” of “our
legal system.”98 Yet Auer deference also facilitates the evasion of notice.99
When an agency adopts a regulatory interpretation through notice-and-comment
rulemaking, it provides the public with notice as to the interpretation it is
considering adopting and the basis for the interpretation. Through this process
those who will be subject to the interpretation are made aware of what agencies
will require of them. Once the agency finalizes the interpretation, as when an
agency promulgates a final rule, the regulated community is on notice of what
the law will require, and has the assurance that these requirements will not
change without additional notice being given.
As the dissenting justices in Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala100 warned,
deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation risks
depriving the regulated community of adequate notice of what a regulatory
agency may impose upon them. Deferring to the agency’s previously unarticu-
lated interpretation undermines the principle that agency rules binding private
conduct should be “clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate
notice concerning the agency’s understanding of the law.”101 This is of particu-
lar concern because Auer deference applies when a regulation is ambiguous—
that is, when the requirements an agency is imposing are not clear. In other
words, Auer deference applies when the regulated community lacks notice of
what is required unless and until the agency issues its interpretation. Auer gives
agencies the opportunity to cure any ambiguity or imprecision in the regulations
they promulgate. As Professor Manning has noted, Auer “relieves the agency of
the cost of imprecision that it has produced.”102 Consequently, agencies are
96. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“By
deferring to interpretive rules, [courts] have allowed agencies to make binding rules unhampered by
notice-and-comment procedures.”).
97. Manning, supra note 13, at 680.
98. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (“A fundamental principle in our
legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is
forbidden or required.”); see also Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A]
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law.”).
99. See Manning, supra note 13, at 669 (arguing such deference “disserves the due process
objectives of giving notice of the law to those who must comply with it and of constraining those who
enforce it”); see also Derek A. Woodman, Rethinking Auer Deference: Agency Regulations and Due
Process Notice, 82 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 1721, 1725 (2014) (“[T]he concern surrounding deference to
an agency’s interpretation of its regulations is fair notice.”).
100. 512 U.S. 504, 526 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 525.
102. See Manning, supra note 13, at 617.
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“less likely” to “give clear notice of its policies either to those who participate
in the rulemaking process prescribed.”103
Auer deference may also facilitate the evasion of notice of conditions placed
upon the receipt of federal funds. Under Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, state recipients of federal funds must have notice of conditions
imposed upon the receipt of such funds in order for such conditions to be
constitutional.104 As the Supreme Court explained in South Dakota v. Dole, “if
Congress desires to condition the States’ receipt of funds, it ‘must do so
unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”105 In some cases, the
relevant conditions are defined and delimited in agency regulations. If such
regulations are ambiguous and agencies receive Auer deference for their interpre-
tations of such regulations, then Auer may facilitate the evasion of constitu-
tional constraints upon the imposition of conditions on the recipients of federal
funds. This is particularly true because even if a legal challenge to a new
interpretation might be successful, a grant recipient challenging an agency’s
newly announced interpretation of a regulatory requirement may risk a tempo-
rary cut-off of funds in the interim.
C. Evasion of Responsibility
Auer deference also encourages agencies to evade their responsibility to
provide detailed guidance and explication of legal requirements when develop-
ing and promulgating regulations. It is inevitable that statutes will leave some
potential questions unaddressed. As James Madison counseled in The Federalist
No. 37: “All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or
less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by
a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”106 As Manning notes, “no
lawmaker can write a law that resolves all issues in advance and removes all
discretion from the interpreter.”107
Because any ambiguity or gap left in a statute constitutes an implicit delega-
tion of authority to the implementing agency, Congress is aware that insofar as
it fails to provide greater specificity or detail in a statute, it is ceding the power
to make such decisions to the executive branch—and Congress is well aware
that the executive branch may be controlled by those with different political
priorities. This gives members of Congress a powerful incentive to consider
when and whether it is worthwhile to provide greater detail and precision in a
regulatory statute.
103. Id.
104. 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
105. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
107. See Manning, supra note 13, at 647.
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Agencies are in a quite different position. When an agency fails to provide
greater detail or precision in a regulation, the agency is not ceding control to
another branch of government. To the contrary, the agency is effectively ceding
such authority to itself.108 Yet the shift in power is not merely temporal in
nature.109 The agency that fails to resolve statutory ambiguities in its implement-
ing regulations may actually give itself greater power and flexibility to define a
law’s requirements in the future.110
Drafting and promulgating regulations can be time-consuming and costly,
both in terms of agency resources and political capital. It may take substantial
effort for an agency to imbue a regulatory proposal with greater detail and
precision. It may be difficult to accurately foretell how a particular regulatory
mechanism may operate in practice. Under Auer, however, filling such gaps at a
later date is actually easier than doing so through the regulatory process.
Attempting to resolve a difficult question raised by a given regulatory proposal
in the rulemaking process is costly. Resolving the same question later through a
guidance, “Dear Colleague” letter, or even an amicus brief is comparatively
easy—and less prone to challenge.
D. Evasion of Finality
As a general rule, an agency action cannot be challenged in court unless it is
final.111 When a final rule is promulgated, there is no question that there has
been a final agency action, and judicial review is available. When agencies
engage in other actions, however, there is often a dispute as to whether the
action in question is final and therefore ripe for review.112 This creates an
incentive for agencies to adopt regulatory interpretations in forms that are less
108. Manning, supra note 13, at 647–48 (“[W]hen a lawmaker controls the interpretation of its own
laws, an important incentive for adopting transparent and self-limiting rules is lost because any
discretion created by an imprecise, vague, or ambiguous law inures to the very entity that created it.”).
109. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia, J. concurring)
(“Because the agency (not Congress) drafts the substantive rules that are the object of those interpreta-
tions, giving them deference allows the agency to control the extent of its notice-and-comment-free
domain. To expand this domain, the agency need only write substantive rules more broadly and
vaguely, leaving plenty of gaps to be filled in later, using interpretive rules unchecked by notice and
comment.”).
110. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 8, at 1464 (“[A]n agency confronted with a statutory
ambiguity might try to bootstrap its way into the equivalent of Chevron deference by promulgating a
legislative rule that preserves or restates the statutory ambiguity, and then issuing an interpretive rule
that purports to interpret not the statute, but the regulation.”). But see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243 (2006) (embracing an “anti-parroting” rule).
111. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (“As a general matter, two conditions must
be satisfied for agency action to be ‘final’: First, the action must mark the ‘consummation’ of the
agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And
second, the action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which
‘legal consequences will flow.’” (citations omitted)).
112. See, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016) (Army Corps
alleged jurisdictional determinations under the Clean Water Act were not reviewable because such
determinations did not constitute final agency actions.).
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vulnerable to judicial review.113
Under Auer, agency interpretations of their own regulations need not be
offered in the form of regulations or other readily reviewable agency actions.
Instead, these interpretations may be offered in interpretative rules, guidance
documents, “Dear Colleague” letters, and other forms that are generally not
subject to judicial review as they are not generally recognized to be final agency
action. Consequently, when agencies rely upon such actions and documents to
offer authoritative interpretations of their own regulations, this enables agencies
to argue that their interpretations are not immediately subject to judicial review
as final agency actions. This evasion of finality makes it more difficult for
regulated entities and affected interests to challenge the interpretations that
agencies may claim are eligible for Auer deference. Even where an agency
action substantively alters the legal obligations of the regulated community,
agencies retain the incentive to characterize such actions as merely interpreta-
tive rules, so as to circumvent APA requirements and forestall judicial review.
Yet agencies need not give up Auer deference in the process.114
Some courts have gotten wise to this form of evasion, looking to the
substance of an agency action in order to determine whether it is final and
subject to judicial review, rather than looking merely at the label attached to the
action by the agency.115 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in
particular, has found guidance documents to be reviewable despite agency
protestations that the relevant documents were not final agency actions.116
Scrutinizing agency actions thus limits—though does not eliminate—the threat
of evasion in this context. Regulated entities may not always recognize a
guidance document or letter as a substantive limitation and courts may some-
times accept agency arguments that a guidance is, in fact, only a guidance, and
does not impose substantive requirements. Further, the threat that an agency’s
regulatory interpretation may, in subsequent litigation, receive Auer deference
means that regulated entities must often invest resources in immediate chal-
113. See generally Bryan Clark & Amanda Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek: What Agencies Can
(and Can’t) Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 BOS. COLL. L. REV. 1687 (2011); see also Jennifer Nou,
Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1789 (2013) (“[A]gencies
can choose between simple inaction, adjudication, guidance documents, or nonsignificant rules as
instruments that are more likely as a class to bypass presidential review.”); Michael S. Greve & Ashley
C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501, 522 (2015) (“The
perennial danger [is] that agencies might manipulate their choice of procedures . . . to evade re-
view . . . .”).
114. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 547, 555 (2000) (“[T]he agency has an incentive to mischaracterize a legislative rule as
interpretative to circumvent the APA rulemaking procedure.”).
115. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (rejecting Department of
Education argument that a “Dear Colleague” letter on the accommodation of transgender students under
Title IX was not ripe for judicial review).
116. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (concluding EPA
Clean Air Act periodic monitoring guidance was a final action for purposes of judicial review).
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lenges to such actions in order to preserve their claims.117 Under some statutes,
such as the Clean Water Act, certain regulatory determinations are subject to
relatively short limitation periods and may not be challenged in the context of
an enforcement action.118 Thus, even when a guidance document does not
impose new legal constraints or adopt a new regulatory interpretation, it may
still impose costs on regulated entities.
IV. AUER SIGNIFICANCE
The recent, high-profile dispute over the Department of Education’s reinterpre-
tation of the requirements of Title IX helps to illustrate how Auer facilitates the
evasion of administrative law norms in practice.119 This particular dispute arose
when a high school student in Gloucester County, Virginia, Gavin Grimm,
informed school officials that Grimm would like to use the school facilities that
correspond with Grimm’s gender identity instead of those that corresponded
with Grimm’s sex at birth. The school resisted Grimm’s request, and litigation
ensued, with Grimm insisting that the school’s refusal to accommodate the
request violated federal law.120
Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, no educational
institution that receives federal funding may discriminate “on the basis of
sex.”121 This prohibition applies to all fund-recipient operations and facilities.
Title IX expressly allows for the maintenance of single-sex living facilities,
such as dormitories, bathrooms, and the like.122 Perhaps because questions of
gender identity were not particularly salient at the time, Title IX did not define
the term “sex.”
After Title IX’s enactment, the U.S. Department of Education promulgated
regulations to implement the statutory prohibition. One regulation of particular
relevance provides that: “A recipient may provide separate toilet, locker room,
and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for
students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for students
117. See Clark & Leiter, supra note 113, at 1690–91 (noting that, under some federal statutes, the
form of the agency action determines whether judicial review is available); see also M. Elizabeth
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1420 (2004) (“The form of the
regulatory action dictates the . . . availability and nature of judicial review.”).
118. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (2012) (requiring certain challenges to be filed within 120 days
of promulgation of relevant agency action, and prohibiting review in the context of “any civil or
criminal proceeding for enforcement” if review could otherwise have been obtained).
119. Portions of this discussion are adapted from Jonathan H. Adler, What “Sex” Has to Do with
Seminole Rock, in Symposium, supra note 14, at 30–32.
120. See generally G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (arguing that the
school board’s refusal to allow G.G. to use the bathroom corresponding to his gender identity
“impermissibly discriminated against him in violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution”).
121. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1986).
122. See 20 U.S.C. § 1686 (1972).
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of the other sex.”123 Like the statute, however, the Education Department’s
regulations do not define the term “sex.”
Decades after these regulations were adopted, the Department of Education
concluded that Title IX imposes obligations on educational institutions with
regard to transgender students. Specifically, the Department decided that Title
IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination should be applied so as to take account of
an individual’s gender identity, as opposed to that individual’s biological sex at
birth. Had the agency conducted a notice-and-comment rulemaking, the result-
ing rule defining “sex” and detailing how Title IX’s requirements would apply
in the context of transgender individuals would have been eligible for Chevron
deference. Yet no such rulemaking was ever conducted. Instead the Department
wrote a letter.
In deciding to forego rulemaking on this question, the Department evaded the
potential political consequences of taking a side on a contentious cultural issue.
Rather than address this question through regulations—which would have
required going through a lengthy (and likely controversial) notice-and-comment
rulemaking, and would have certainly prompted a legal challenge—the Educa-
tion Department simply declared in letters124 and guidance documents125 that
the federal prohibition “encompasses discrimination based on a student’s gender
identity, including discrimination based on a student’s transgender status.”126
The Department further declared that it would treat “a student’s gender
identity as the student’s sex for purposes of Title IX and its implementing
regulations,” and that, as a consequence “a school must not treat a transgender
student differently from the way it treats other students of the same gender
identity.”127 In the Department’s view, Title IX and its regulations require that
once a student’s parent or guardian “notifies the school administration that the
student will assert a gender identity that differs from previous representations or
records, the school will begin treating the student consistent with the student’s
gender identity.”128
As the relevant guidance documents (and court filings) made clear, the
Department wanted the benefits of judicial deference to its interpretation with-
out having to go through the time and effort of a rulemaking. Not only would
123. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2017). See also 34 C.F.R. § 106.32(b) (2017) (requiring all such
facilities to be “comparable”).
124. See Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Educ. to Emily Prince (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.bricker.com/
documents/misc/transgender_student_restroom_access_1-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/QM6P-SVB2]; see
also U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Opinion Letter on Transgender Students (May 13,
2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PK6T-FZXN] [hereinafter Dear Colleague].
125. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND
SINGLE–SEX ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY CLASSES AND EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES (2014), https://www2.
ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/faqs-title-ix-single-sex-201412.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR9G-TKH3].
126. See Dear Colleague, supra note 124.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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such an effort consume agency resources and potentially court controversy, it
would result in a final agency action—a final rule—that would be a ready target
for litigation.
In G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, the Department argued that these
interpretations were eligible for Auer deference—and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit agreed. As the Fourth Circuit noted, the relevant regula-
tions did not address whether or how transgender individuals should be accom-
modated under Title IX.
Although the regulation may refer unambiguously to males and females, it is silent
as to how a school should determine whether a transgender individual is a male or
female for the purpose of access to sex-segregated restrooms. We conclude that
the regulation is susceptible to more than one plausible reading because it
permits both the Board’s reading—determining maleness or femaleness with
reference exclusively to genitalia—and the Department’s interpretation—
determining maleness or femaleness with deference to gender identity.129
Concluding that “the regulation is ambiguous as applied to transgender
individuals,” the Fourth Circuit then concluded that it must defer to the Depart-
ment’s interpretation under Auer.130
Whether or not one believes the Department of Education adopted the best
interpretation of Title IX—either as a matter of law or a matter of policy—
deference to the agency’s interpretation facilitated the evasion of administrative
law norms. For starters, the relevant ambiguity is found in the underlying
statutory language as well as in the Department’s regulations. It was the work of
the legislature, not the regulatory agency. Consequently, by deferring to the
Department’s regulatory interpretation, the court effectively facilitated the eva-
sion of the constraints traditionally placed upon Chevron deference.
Granting Auer deference in this case also enabled the agency to alter its
longstanding interpretations and understandings of relevant legal requirements
without going through the rulemaking process. In the case at hand, this enabled
the agency to sidestep difficult questions, such as how to balance accommoda-
tion of gender identity with concerns for privacy and modesty and whether
schools may require a gender dysphoria diagnosis before providing an accommo-
dation (as is often requirement before providing accommodations for certain
disabilities), and so on. In the context of Title IX, it may also have given the
Education Department a new means of circumventing the clear notice require-
ments for conditions placed on federal grants to states. In this way, the court’s
decision facilitated the evasion of accountability, responsibility, and notice.
It is quite clear that the Department of Education had sought to delay, if not
avoid, judicial review of its interpretation. When the Department’s “Dear
129. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 720 (4th Cir. 2016).
130. Id. at 721.
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Colleague” letter explaining how it would interpret its own regulations was
challenged directly in separate litigation, the Department argued (unsuccess-
fully) that its interpretation did not constitute a final action and was not ripe for
review.131 The Department made this argument even though it was simultane-
ously claiming that its interpretation was binding under Auer in other litigation.
This episode also highlights how Auer deference is an uneasy fit with
Chevron’s domain.132 As discussed above, Chevron deference is premised upon
a theory of delegation. Statutory gaps and ambiguities are understood to repre-
sent implicit delegations of authority from the legislature to the agency. When
agencies promulgate ambiguous regulations, however, they cannot be said to be
delegating anything to themselves.
Insofar as Title IX is ambiguous, Chevron provides that Congress has del-
egated authority to the Education Department to fill in the details and clarify
grant recipient obligations. Chevron and its progeny further make clear that
such gap-filling and clarification is to come in the form of regulations or other
agency actions that have the force of law—and not in the form of guidance
letters or legal advocacy. So, to grant Auer deference to the Education Depart-
ment’s guidance letters here allows the Department to exercise its delegated
power without having to fulfill the procedural requirements that ensure greater
transparency and accountability in the exercise of such power. And if agencies
are given this sort of opportunity to circumvent Chevron’s requirements, we
should expect them to act accordingly. By facilitating the evasion of administra-
tive law norms, courts enable the evasion of Chevron’s domain as well.
As a policy matter, the Education Department may well have been correct.
Nothing in this discussion should be read to suggest that Title IX cannot or
should not be interpreted and applied as the Education Department insisted. But
for Title IX to be applied and enforced as the Education Department wants, the
Department must promulgate an interpretation worthy of judicial deference—
and any such interpretation must be adopted in the usual course and through the
proper procedures.
The irony of the story is that the same evasions that facilitated the Depart-
ment’s effort to evade Chevron and the traditional constraints of administrative
law were also the policy’s undoing. After the 2016 election, partisan control of
the Department of Education switched hands. Because the Department’s transgen-
der student policy was contained in “Dear Colleague” letters and guidance
documents, it could be eliminated as easily as it was put in place. The Depart-
ment of Education’s policy was rescinded, and the decision in G.G. v. Gloucester
County was vacated by the Supreme Court,133 and subsequently dismissed as
moot, as Gavin Grimm had graduated high school, and no longer needed an
131. See Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
132. See infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
133. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.).
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accommodation.134 In seeking to impose a policy without going through the
traditional regulatory process, the Department made the policy particularly easy
to undo.
V. AUER END?
It is possible that Auer is “on its last gasp.”135 As noted above, several
justices on the Court have expressed misgivings about the doctrine.136 The
Court has not, as yet, been willing to reconsider the doctrine directly.
While not reconsidering Auer’s foundations, the Court has taken the opportu-
nity to limit some of the doctrine’s more extreme applications. In Gonzales v.
Oregon, for example, the Court held that where a regulation merely parrots the
relevant statutory language, agency interpretations are not eligible for Auer
deference.137 Whereas the regulation interpreted in Auer “gave specificity” to
the underlying statutory scheme the agency was entrusted to implement, the
regulation in Gonzales did “little more than restate the terms of the statute
itself.”138 The language the agency sought to interpret came from Congress.139
As a consequence, what the federal government claimed was a regulatory
interpretation eligible for Auer deference was in fact a statutory interpretation
that could only receive deference if the requirements for Chevron deference
were met. To conclude otherwise would have enabled agencies to use Auer to
circumvent Chevron’s more demanding requirements.140 In addition, the Court
noted that, insofar as the interpretation at issue could not represent the agency’s
“intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation,” this was a further reason to
deny Auer deference.
While the Gonzales holding was limited, there is some reason to believe it
has had an effect on the application of Auer in the lower courts—at least where
lower courts pay attention.141 According to one empirical study of Auer in
federal appellate courts, agency win rates under Auer were lower between 2006
134. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2017).
135. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
136. See supra note 15.
137. 546 U.S. 243, 244 (2006).
138. Id. at 256–57.
139. Id.
140. Perhaps ironically, Justice Scalia dissented in Gonzales v. Oregon, maintaining the case called
for a “straightforward application of our rule that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is
‘controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” 546 U.S. at 277 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Scalia’s dissent, “broadly drawn regulations are entitled to no less
respect than narrow ones,” even if the regulations at issue do little more than restate the relevant
statutory language. Id. at 277–78. Justice Scalia also disputed the majority’s claim that the regulation at
issue parroted the relevant statutory text. Id. at 278.
141. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying Auer deference
without considering the Gonzales anti-parroting canon).
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and 2013 than they had been between 1993 and 2006.142 The agency win rate in
Auer cases of 78 percent prior to 2006 dropped to 71 percent.143 The compa-
rable win rate for Chevron cases during the period of study was 68 percent.144
Thus, while the precise holding of Gonzales was narrow, it may have had a
disciplining effect on Auer in the circuit courts.
More recently, in Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corporation, the Court
reaffirmed that Auer’s “general rule does not apply in all cases.”145 Citing
language from Auer itself, the Court noted that no deference is due where the
interpretation is contradicted by the relevant regulatory text or where “there is
reason to suspect that the agency’s interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s
fair and considered judgment on the matter.’”146 Such suspicions may arise
where an agency alters a longstanding view or adopts what appears to be little
more than a “convenient litigating position.”147
In Christopher the Court refused to accord Auer deference to an interpreta-
tion that would have imposed significant liability for conduct that occurred prior
to the issuance of the interpretation.148 Providing deference in such a circum-
stance, the Court reasoned, would “seriously undermine the principle that
agencies should provide regulated parties fair warning of the conduct a regula-
tion prohibits or requires.”149 Citing concerns Justice Scalia had voiced the year
before, Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court warned of the threat posed by
allowing agency’s to offer definitive interpretations of “vague and open-ended
regulations” long after the regulations were first issued.150 As Justice Alito
explained:
It is one thing to expect regulated parties to conform their conduct to an
agency’s interpretations once the agency announces them; it is quite another
to require regulated parties to divine the agency’s interpretations in advance
or else be held liable when the agency announces its interpretations for the
first time in an enforcement proceeding and demands deference.151
In the wake of the Christopher decision, the Court has had several opportuni-
ties to revisit Auer deference, but has largely sought to evade the issue. Not only
142. See William Yeatman, An Empirical Defense of Auer Step Zero, 106 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2831651; see also Cynthia Barmore, Auer
in Action: Deference after Talk America, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 813 (2015) (finding drop in rate at which
circuit courts grant Auer deference after 2012).
143. Yeatman, supra note 85.
144. Id.
145. 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012).
146. Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
147. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)).
148. Id. at 155–56.
149. Id. at 156 (internal quotation omitted).
150. Id. at 158 (citing Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tele. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
151. Id.at 158–59.
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did the Court not reach the underlying issue in Christopher or Decker, it has
rejected petitions for certiorari asking the Court to reconsider the doctrine from
the ground up.152 The Court accepted certiorari in Gloucester County School
Board v. G.G., but pointedly declined to include the reconsideration of Auer in
the questions accepted for review.153 One suspects, however, that the Court will
not be able to evade the Auer question for long.
Overturning Auer would help prevent the evasion of administrative law
norms identified above, but would not likely work a revolution in administrative
law. Eliminating Auer deference would not require courts to dispose of the
“common sense” idea that agencies are in a better position to understand what
was intended when a regulation was adopted or how it was thought to operate.
Without Auer to rely upon, agencies would still have ample opportunity to
convince reviewing courts that their interpretations are preferable to the avail-
able alternatives. Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., agency “interpretations and
opinions . . . while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority”
are still worthy of significant respect, for they “constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance.”154 As the Court held in Christopher, in the absence of Auer defer-
ence, agency interpretations of their own regulations still receive “a measure of
deference proportional to the ‘thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade.’”155
The Court should stop evading Auer so it can stop Auer evasions.
152. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016) (denial of certiorari).
153. 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016). The Court subsequently vacated the decision below and remanded the
case back to the court of appeals after the regulatory interpretation at issue was rescinded by the
Department of Education. 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
154. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
155. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 159 (2012) (quoting Skidmore, 323
U.S. at 140).
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